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Summary: In recent years there has been considerable debate 
over how best to formulate reliable estimates of conﬂ  ict mortali-
ty rates. However, in formulating humanitarian policy to respond 
to violent conﬂ  icts it is important to go beyond crude mortality 
rates to look at the causes and timings of deaths. This Policy 
Brieﬁ  ng presents the results of a MICROCON study on Darfur 
which disaggregates causes of death, and discusses the implica-
tions for humanitarian policy. The results of the study demon-
strate the importance of improving sanitation and health services   
in displacement camps. It also provides some evidence of the hu-
man impact of shortfalls in humanitarian funding, and highlights 
the vital importance of consistent and adequate ﬁ  nancial support 
for relief efforts.
What is a reliable ﬁ  gure for 
conﬂ  ict-related deaths in 
Darfur?
What were the main causes 
of death?




Mortality in complex emergencies 
has  been  an  important  subject  of 
research and debate during the past 
decade. Recent conﬂ  icts – such as 
those  in  the  Democratic  Republic 
of Congo, Iraq, and Darfur – have 
generated  substantive  discussions 
about  numbers  and  rates  of  death 
as a result of wars. Such ﬁ  gures are 
important to the media, and are used 
to raise awareness of crises around 
the  world.  The  inﬂ  uence  that  the 
media has on public opinion it also 
has  over  policymakers  and  politi-
cians, and hence humanitarian aid 
has often been sidetracked because 
mortality data have been used for 
political purposes, and because of 
the resulting legal implications. An 
example  of  this  is  the  expulsion 
of  humanitarian  non-governmen-
tal organisations from Darfur after 
the issue of a warrant of arrest by 
the  International  Criminal  Court 
against Omar Bashir, the president 
of Sudan.
Estimates of death tolls in any one 
particular  conﬂ  ict  often  vary  very 
considerably.  Table  1  shows  the 
widely varying estimates of mortal-
ity rates in Darfur during 2003–08. 
Similarly,  in  Iraq  mortality  esti-
mates referring to the same period 
ranged from 65,000 to 650,000; and 
in the Democratic Republic of Con-
go estimates ranged from 200,000 
to 5,000,000. 
A further problem is that many anal-
yses  in  conﬂ  ict-affected  countries 
focus  mainly  on  the  total  number 
of deaths, and less on the causes or 
patterns. In several studies in Dar-
fur, a constant death rate was ex-
trapolated to the entire duration of 
the conﬂ  ict and affected population. 
This approach means that conﬂ  ict-
related  mortality  was  assumed  to 
be  constant  with  time,  and  across 
geographical space, which was not 
the case. Furthermore, the conﬂ  ict 
affected different parts of the popu-
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A food aid convoy in Darfur
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Going  beyond  the  estimation  of 
crude  numbers  of  deaths  is  vital 
in informing attempts to limit the 
number of deaths caused in future 
conﬂ  icts. Analysing the number of 
cause-speciﬁ  c deaths improves our 
understanding of conﬂ  ict and its dy-
namics, and MICROCON has been 
undertaking such research on Dar-
fur. This Policy Brieﬁ  ng discusses 
the most important ﬁ  ndings of this 
study and its policy implications. 
It ﬁ  nds that the majority of deaths 
occurred  not  due  to  violence,  but 
due to overcrowding and unsanitary 
conditions in displacement camps. 
In addition, the mortality rate rose 
still  further  when  the  number  of 
aid workers employed in the area 
declined relative to the population, 
underlining  the  importance  of  ad-
equate  investment  in  emergency 
relief.
2. History of the Conﬂ  ict
The  Darfur  region  has  seen  low-
level  ﬁ  ghting  between  communi-
ties for decades. This has generally 
centred  around  a  history  of  ten-
sions between those claiming Arab 
descent,  who  assume  superiority 
over other groups, and those who 
are considered black Africans – al-
though ʻArabsʼ are often physically 
indistinguishable  from  ʻAfricansʼ. 
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It is commonly found that less than ten per cent of deaths in 
conﬂ  ict-affected areas are caused by violence
sometimes provided air support as 
these  militias  burned  and  looted 
villages in the region, killing men, 
raping  women  and  forcing  large 
parts of the population to ﬂ  ee their 
homes.  A  large  proportion  of  the 
population  have  ﬂ  ed  their  homes 
and  live  in  Internally  Displaced 
Personsʼ (IDP) camps in the region. 
A further 200,000 have sought ref-
uge over the border in neighbouring 
Chad.
3. Methods
The  MICROCON  study  consisted 
of a ʻsurvey of surveysʼ. Data for 
mortality rates in Darfur were ob-
tained from Centre for Research on 
the Epidemiology of Diseasesʼ on-
line complex emergency database. 
Statistical data for health and nutri-
tion were extracted from 63 popula-
tion-based surveys done in conﬂ  ict-
affected areas since 2000 and stored 
on this database. The main indica-
tors for mortality included overall 
and  child  (under  5  years)  mortal-
ity rates. The quality of this survey 
data was checked, and the sampling 
methods,  calculation  of  rates  and 
limitations were assessed.
A UN OCHA series about Darfur 
served as a second source of statis-
tical data for the number of affect-
ed people and other essential data 
about humanitarian issues such as 
displacement of people and human-
The recent, more intense, conﬂ  ict in 
Darfur began in 2003 with an attack 
on government posts by the Sudan 
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/
A)  and  the  Justice  and  Equality 
Movement (JEM). The two move-
ments were demanding greater po-
litical representation in Khartoum. 
The government responded by in-
creasing  support  for  local  militias 
–  often  mobile  groups  of  ʻArabʼ 
Darfuri  –  and  government  forces 
itarian  aid  staff,  and  food  supply. 
Based on this data, the conﬂ  ict was 
divided into six phases, from 2003 
to  2008,  and  regression  analysis 
carried out for overall, violence-re-
lated, diarrhoea and child mortality 
rates.
4. Violence versus illness as cause 
of death
From this analysis, the number of 
ʻexcessʼ  deaths  –  those  over  and 
above  what  might  be  expected  in 
peacetime – was estimated to be ap-
proximately  300,000.  The  overall 
mortality rate consistently decreased 
with time, and the main reduction 
was  in  violence-related  mortality. 
The ﬁ  ndings suggest however that 
more than 80% of excess deaths were 
not a result of the violence. These 
results are in agreement with stud-
ies of other conﬂ  icts in which initial 
mortality peaks were often related 
to a period of intense violence and 
subsequently high number of vio-
lence-related  deaths,  but  the  main 
causes of mortality during the sta-
bilisation period were diseases such 
as diarrhoea. In fact, it is commonly 
found in many conﬂ  icts that less than 
ten per cent of deaths in conﬂ  ict-af-
fected areas are caused by violence.
The  study  further  identiﬁ  es  sig-
niﬁ  cant  differences  between  resi-
dents and displaced people. Over-
all,  surveys  of  populations  with 
large proportions of internally dis-
placed  people  had  higher  mortal-
ity  rates  than  those  consisting  of 
only  non-displaced  individuals. 
Outside an IDP camp in Shangel Tubaya, 
Darfur. © Radio Nederland WereldomroepHowever, the effect of displacement 
is different when mortality rates are 
split into violence-related and non-
violence-related  mortality  rates. 
Mortality associated with violence 
is generally lower in samples with 
many displaced individuals, but that 
associated with non-violence is sig-
niﬁ  cantly higher. 
This difference could suggest that 
settings  in  which  there  are  inter-
nally displaced people are protected 
from attacks, but overcrowding and 
precarious  situations  in  which  the 
displaced  people  live  increase  the 
risk  of  death  from  communicable 
diseases. Conversely, it would sug-
gest that those staying at home are 
more at risk from violence, but live 
in healthier conditions. 
5. The role of humanitarian 
assistance
The results for July, 2006, to Sep-
tember,  2007,  warrant  some  ad-
ditional  attention. The  period  was 
characterised by a rise in insecurity 
and robbery, leading to a new wave 
of  displacement.  Overall  mortal-
ity rates for this period are similar 
to those of the previous period, but 
this  continuity  masks  a  divergent 
pattern in cause-speciﬁ  c mortality. 
On the one hand, deaths from vio-
lence  continued  to  decrease,  even 
though insecurity had increased. On 
the other hand, the diarrhoea-related 
mortality rate increased during that 
period, as did the mortality rate in 
children younger than 5 years. 
A possible explanation for this in-
crease  is  the  18%  reduction  in 
number of humanitarian aid work-
ers  during  that  period,  while  the 
number of affected people increased 
from 3.5 million to 4.2 million. As a 
result, the ratio of affected people to 
humanitarian aid workers increased 
by almost 50%, from 237 to 346 af-
fected per staff member.
The ﬁ  rst explanation for the reduc- POLICY BRIEFING 7 JANUARY 2011
tion in the number of humanitarian 
personnel was increased insecurity 
resulting in only a few areas being 
accessible,  thus  directly  reducing 
the need for staff.
The second reason is related to a re-
duction in humanitarian budget that 
was allocated to Darfur. In March, 
2006,  UNICEFʼs  representative  in 
Sudan warned that reduced funding 
could severely affect the humanitar-
ian operations in Darfur. One month 
later,  the  World  Food  Programme 
reduced  the  food  aid  rations  by 
50%  because  of  funding  short-
ages. By November, 2006, 98% of 
funds needed for food aid had been 
pledged, but sectors such as health, 
water, and sanitation still had major 
gaps. By mid 2007, 85% of needed 
funds  had  been  provided,  includ-
ing 78% for health and nutrition re-
quirements, and 86% for water and 
sanitation. At about the same time, 
mortality  rates  decreased  again, 
suggesting that although insecurity 
might  have  contributed  mostly  to 
the  mortality  increase  during  that 
period,  the  decreased  humanitar-
ian aid as a consequence of funding 
shortages and resulting increase in 
number  of  disease-related  deaths 
accounted for the rise in mortality 
rate between July, 2006, to Septem-
ber, 2007.
These ﬁ  ndings are particularly im-
portant,  because  they  demonstrate 
the  central  importance  of  sustain-
able  funding  for  IDP  camps  and 
affected populations more broadly. 
As funding levels drop, conditions 
in the camps become unsuitable due 
to  shortages  in  staff  and  medical 
equipment, overcrowding and dete-
riorating sanitary conditions.
6. Conclusion – Humanitarian 
response and statistics
The MICROCON study in Darfur 
clearly  shows  that  efforts  to  limit 
the  human  impacts  of  the  violent 
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well-funded,  and  that  such  efforts 
clearly save many lives – particu-
larly through improving conditions 
in IDP camps.
There is also an important conclu-
sion to be drawn about the use of 
statistics in making decisions about 
humanitarian assistance: In order to 
appropriately target assistance and 
determine its impact, it is vital to 
break down information on mortal-
ity by geographical area and cause.
In addition, a broader set of indi-
cators need to be used in decisions 
than even disaggregated mortality. 
Policymakers  have  often  tried  to 
make evidence-based decisions re-
garding  humanitarian  emergencies 
based on overall mortality rates. In 
deciding whether an event is clas-
siﬁ  ed as a humanitarian emergency 
the threshold for an emergency situ-
ation is one death per 10,000 popu-
lation per day. Unfortunately, if this 
number  has  already  been  reached 
then valuable time will already have 
been wasted before interventions are 
prepared, so it is important to move 
beyond mortality rates to ʻleadingʼ 
indicators. These could include nu-
trition and vaccination rates, which 
are earlier indicators of trends. This 
is not a comprehensive early warn-
ing system, but these indicators give 
a much more timely indication of 
problems. Whilst mortality indica-
tors still have a use, the focus needs 
to be broader to include other kinds 
of indicators.
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